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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This appeal arises from the district court s dismissal of common law claims made by 
Appellant Dar'n Bergeman (Bergeman) regarding the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of real 
property in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The property was own d by Karen Hansen, Bergeman's mother. 
Ms. Hansen entered into a mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust on the property. Respondent 
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (SPS) serviced the loan. After Ms. Hansen died in 2006, 
Bergeman occupied the property and made payments on the loan, but he did not assume the loan. 
In 2015, the loan went into default. In February 2017, the property was foreclosed and sold to 
Respondent Mohamed Elabed (Elabed). 
In his second amended complaint, Bergeman alleged the foreclosure sale was wrongfol 
and invalid. He sought to set aside the foreclosure sale, enjoin a separate eviction action brought 
by Rlabed, and hold SPS and Elabed (and other defendants) liable for money damages, all based 
on claims of misrepresentation, negligent supervision, trespass, and the infliction of emotional 
di stress. Before the district court, Bergeman moved to consolidate thi s_ action with Elabed's 
eviction action under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a), and that motion was denied. SPS and 
Elabed each moved to dismiss Bergeman' s compla int under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(6), and those motions were gr.anted, 
On appeal, Bergeman contends the district court erred in dismissing his complaint and in 
denying his motion to consolidate. But in his opening brief, Bergeman offers no analysis and 
cites no authority to support his assignments of error, Perhaps most obvious, he does not cite a 
- 1-
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single element of any of his cause.s of action, and he offe1 no analysis of how the fac tual 
allegations in the second amended complaint relate to or support those claims. He a1so does not 
explain how the district comi abused its discretion in denying his motion to consolidate. A party 
waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. This Court should 
affirm the district court's rulings for that reason alone. 
But even if Bergeman has not waived hi s appeal issues, he still has not shown enor by 
the district court. The second amend d complaint is premised on conclusory allegations that the 
foreclosme sale was wrongful and that SPS is liable for misrepresentation, negligent supervision, 
trespass, and the infliction of emotional distress. However, Bergeman alleged no facts to show 
that the foreclosure violated Idaho's foreclosure requirements. He also admitted that the 
mortgage loan was in default, that he never assumed the loan, and that Ms. Hansen's estate 
remained the borrower on the loan. Because Bergeman failed to allege facts to support any of his 
claims, the district court correctly dismissed his second amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). 
As for his motion to consolidate, Bergeman fails to show how the district court violated any part 
of the three-part abuse of discretion standard. 
The Court should affirm the district court ' s rulings that the second amended complaint 
states no valid cause of.action against SP ' and that consolidation of this action and Elabed's 
eviction action was not appropriate. 
B. Statement of facts and com~ e of proceedings . 
Because the trial court deci,ded this case on motions to dismiss, the facts are set forth in 
Bergeman' s second amended complaint and the exhibits attached to, i.ncorporated into, and made 
-2-
part of the complaint. See R. 36-66.1 More legible copie-s of the exhibits are found at R. 16~35. 
1. After Bergeman's mother died, he occupied the property and paid the 
mortgage loan,. but he did not assume the loan. 
Bcrgeman's mother, Karen Hans n, own d real property Jocated at 1623 \Vest 145 No11h 
Idaho Fal1s, Idal10 83401. R. 38-39 (iii! I 0-1 1 ). he propetty consists of a home and acreage. R. 
38 c,j 10). In October 1998, Ms. Hansen executed a pi· missory note and, as security for the note, 
granted a deed of trust on the property in favor of WMC Mortgage Corporation (WMC 
Mort a e . See R. 36-37 (~ 2), 53, 55, 61. The deed of trust was recorded in the mortgage 
records of Bonneville County. See R. 53, 55. The mortgage loan and deed of trust were 
eventually assigned to U.S. Bank National Association as trustee (U.S, Bank). R. 37 (il 3), 53, 
55. SPS is currently the servicer for the loan. R. 37 (ii 4). 
After Ms. Hansen's death in 2006, Bergeman took possession of the property. R. 39 (i! 
12). Mortgage statements continued to be sent to the "Estate of Karen Hansen." R. 39 (i! 13). 
Bergeman made payments on the loan, which were accepted and credited to the loan. R. 39 ('i['i[ 
12-13). Bergeman, however, did not assume the mortgage. R. 39 ('ii 13). In March 2012, Donald 
Hansen, the executor of Ms. Hansen's estate, granted Bergeman an executor's deed for the 
property in exchange for $10. R. 36 ('ii 1), 48. 
2. Bergeman stopped paying on the loan in 2015, t.he loan went into default, and 
Elabed bought the property at foireclosure sale in February 2017. 
In July 2015, Bergeman was convicted of a probation violati.on and sentenced to serve 
time in an Idaho correctional facility. R. 39 ('ii 12). Around that time, Bergeman stopped making 
1 The Clerk' s Record is cited as "R." and the Clerk's Supplemental Record is cited as 
"Supp.R" The transcript is cited as "Tr." Appellant's Opening Brief is cited as .. AOB." 
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payments on the mortgage loan. In the second amended complaint~ Bergeman alleges he either 
mad payments or made arrangements for others to make payments until the fal] of 2016. Id. But 
a Notice of Default recorded in Bonneville County in September 2016 states that Ms. Hansen or 
her successor in interest had not made monthly payments since February 2015 and was in default 
on the loan. R. 55-56; see also R. 6 1 ("As of February 15, (2017]! you ~r 745 days delinquent on 
your mortgage loan."). Despite this discrepancy, Bergeman admits the loan was in default. See 
R. 40 (~[ 14); see also AOB 9, 16~17, 18, 19 (recognizing Bergernan's admissions that the loan 
was in default). 
According to the Notice of Default, through September 2016, Ms. Hansen owed 
$11,278.02, plus $221.34 in late charges and $1,047.38 in other fees and costs. R. 56. In 
addition, the Notice of Default declared that $30,942.62 in principal and $5,486.81 in interest, 
plus an escrow balance of$10,382.55, was immediately due. Id. The Notice of Default was 
followed in October 2016 by a Trustee's Notice of Sale, which announced the property would be 
sold at a foreclosure sale on February 23, 2017. R. 53-54. The Notice of Default and Trustee's 
Notice of Sale were posted on the property, R. 58, and notice of the foreclosure sale was also 
published in The Post Register, R. 59-60. 
On December 30, 2016, an Affidavit of Mailing of Trustee's Notice of Sale was recorded 
in Bonneville County, along with the otice of Default and Trustee's Notice of Sale. R. 50-57; 
see also R. 18-25. According to the affidavit, the notices were mailed to the Estate of Karen 
Hansen, Donald Hansen (as the executor of the Estate of Karen Hansen), the heirs and devisees 
-4-
of Karen Hansen, Darin Bergeman the spouse of Dadn Bergeman, and the occupants of the 
property. R. 50-5]. 
During this time, SPS continu d to ·end monthly mort0 a0 stat ments to the state of 
Karen l ansen. R. 39 (,f 1 "), 41 ,r 16(e)). In F bruar 20]7, PS nt a stateme1t sta:tingthatthe 
estate owed $17,932.87 on the mortgage loan. R. 39 (,r 13), 6]-63; see also R. 29-3 1. According 
to Bergeman, the statements misrepresented that the foreclosure sale could and would be vacated 
" in the event the plaintiff made a mortgage payment." R. 41 (,r 16(e)). The February 2017 
statement, however, contains no such statement. See R. 61-63; see also R. 29-31. It states that 
$17,932.87 was due and must be paid to bring the loan current. R. 61; see also R. 29. 
Bergeman also alleges that because he was incarcerated, he was unable to sp ak with the 
defendants named in the second amended complaint. R. 40 (ii 14). He appointed his father, Jerry 
Bergeman, to make arrangem nts to cure any default of the mortgage loan. Id.; R. 64-66. Jerry 
Bergeman made numerous efforts to speak with the defendants, but those efforts were ignored. 
R. 40 (if 14). Bergeman alleges that the defendants refused to discuss the status of the mortgage 
foreclosure with anyone other than the executor of Ms. Hansen's estate. R. 41 (,J 16(a), (b)). 
Despite their refusal to discuss (he mortgage foreclosure, Bergeman also alJeges the 
defendants indicated they "would accept a certain payment, including penalties and interest, from 
the plaintiff' but then refosed to accept a payment of approximately $16,000 wired prior to the 
foreclosure sale. R. 41 (,r 16(c)).. A lso, the defendants purportedly accepted another payment of 
19,422.87 from Bergeman and admitted that the foreclosure sale was vacated and invalidated. 
R. 41 (i l6(f)). Bergeman does not state when those payments were made. [n any event, the 
-5-
foreclosure sa]e went forward on February 23, 2017 ,. " ith the a sistance of AUiance Title 
Company (Alliance Title). See R. 37 (if 5-6). Elabed purchased the property at the foreclosure 
sale through Silvercreek Realty Group (Silvercreek Realty). See R. 37-38 ( 6), 42 ( 16(i)). 
3. The trial court denied Bergeman's motion to consolidate and dismissed his 
second amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
In March 2017, Bergeman filed a complaint R. 7-35. Then in April 2017, he filed an 
amended complaint against SPS, labed, WMC Mortgage, U.S. Bank, Alliance Title, Silvercreek 
Realty, and John Does 1-6. R. 67-95. Ultimately Bergeman served only Elabed, and SPS 
appeared. Bergeman filed a motion to consolidate this action with a separate action Elabed had 
filed to vict the tenant of the property. Supp.R. 1. Ela bed filed the eviction action in Bonneville 
County magistrate court (Case No. CV 2017-1746). R. 43 (,r 20); see also Supp.R. 13-1 6. The 
district court denied the motion to consolidate. R. 98-100. 
Later in April, Bergeman filed another amended complaint against the same defendants. 
R. 36. In his second amended complaint, Bergeman alleged claims of misrepresentation and/or 
negligent supervision, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. R. 40-45 (,r,r 15-26). His prayer for relief asked: (1) for an award 
of damages, (2) that the nonjudicial foreclosure action be set aside, and (3) for injunctive relief 
directing Elabed to stop the eviction action. Bergeman also alleged that the defendants "were and 
still are agents for one another, and are acting under the course and scope of their employment or 
agency thereof, with knowledge and consent of each other." R. 38 ( 8). 
-6-
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SPS and Elabed both moved to dismiss the second amended complain:t based on 
Bergeman 's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
Supp.R. 60 93 . Bergeman did not move to amend his second amended complaint. See generally 
R. 2-6. The district court heard the motions on May 18, 2017, considering only the facts set forth 
in the second amended complaint and its exhibits. See Tr. 13:2-7> 52: 17- 19; R. 104, The district 
court granted the motions to dismiss on June 5> 2017, R. I 03-111 , a1t1d issued a judgment that 
same day, R. 114. On July 13, 2017, Bei geman filed a notice of appeal. R. 11 7. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
SPS states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the trial court correctly dismiss Bcrgeman's second amended couplaint for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted? 
2. Did the trial court corr ctly deny Bergeman's motion to consolidate this action 
with Elabed's eviction action? 
3. Is SPS entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121? 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency 
of a complaint. See Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 ldaho 400, 402,257 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011). On 
appeal, the Court reviews the dismissal of a complaint under the rule de novo. Id. The Court must 
determine if the facts alleged in the complaint, if true, are sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to 
relief. Id. In doing so, the Court must view all the facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff 
and ask if a claim for relief has been stated. Id. '"The issue is not whether the plaintiff will 
-7-
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ultimately prevail, but whether the party is ntitled to offer evidence to support the claims.' 
Orthman v. ldaho Power Co .• 126 Idaho 960, 962, 895 P.2d 561 , 563 (1995) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
But only factual allegations will satisfy I.R.C.P. 8(a)(2)' s requirement of "a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." See Clark v. Olsen, 
110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 995 (1986) (stating purpose of complaint is to inforrn 
def. ndant of material facts upon which action is based). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion 
to dismiss, it is not enough for th complaint to make conclusory allegations. See Owsley v. 
Idaho Indus. omm 'n , 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106 P.3d 455, 462 (2005). "Although the non-
movant is entitled to have his factual assertions treated as true, this privil ge does not extend to 
the conclusions oflaw the non-movant hopes the court to draw from those facts." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
When ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions, the courts examine the complaint in its entirety, 
including documents incorporated into the complaint by reference. Stewart v. Arrington Constr. 
Co., 92 Idaho 526, 530, 446 P.2d 895, 899 (1968) ("Where other matters are incorporated by 
reference in the pleadings, the comi may properly consider such matters in passing on the motion 
attacking the pleadings."); Colafranceschi v. Briley, 159 Idaho 31, 32 n.l, 355 P.3d 1261, 1262 
n.l (2015) (reviewing dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and drawing factual background "from 
the contents of Colafranceschi 's Second Amended Complaint and the attachments thereto"). 
Furthermore, the courts do not accept as true factual allegations that arc contradicted by 
documents incorporated by the complaint See Caldwell v. Village of Mountain Home, 29 Idaho 
-8-
9687531().4 0052162-04991 
13 22, 156 P. 909, 912 (1916) recognizing that general rule that demurrer admits truth of aU 
facts that are pleade.d do snot apply '"to fact which appear unfounded by a record inco:rporated 
in the pleading, or by a document referred to"' (citation omitt d)); Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 
546 f.3d 580, 588 (9th Ch. 2008) ("we need not accept as tru · aUegalions contradicting 
documents that are referenced in the complaint"). 
Motion to consolidate. Whether to consolidate separate actions is a decision left to the 
district court's discretion. See I.R.C.P. 42(a) (court "may" order consolidation); Rueth v. State, 
103 Idaho 74, 80,644 P.2d 1333, 1339 (1 982) (considering whether district court abused its 
discretion in denying motion for bifurcation under I.R.C.P. 42(b)). When reviewing an exercise 
of discretion by the district court, this Court considers whether the lower court perceived the 
issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer limits of its discretion and consistent with the 
legal standards applicable to the choices available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. Wechsler v. Wechsler, 162 Idaho 900,909,407 P.3d 214,223 (2017). 
IV. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
As. explained in Section V.E. below, SPS requests an award of attorney fees on appeal 
under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and an award of costs under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. Bergeman has waived each of his assignments of error on ap1peal because he fails to 
support bis claims w ith authoriity or argument. 
Bergeman contends the district court erred in granting SPS and Elabed's motions to 
dismiss and in denying his motion to consolidate. AOB 10. But Bergeman o "fers no analysis and 
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cites no authority to support his claims of error as required by I.A.R. 35(a (6). See AOB at 16-20. 
As a result he has waived those issues on appeal. See Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53 58, 244 
P.3d 197,. 202 (2010) (finding I.A.R. 35(a)(6) was not satisfied when party failed to support issue 
on appeal "vith propositions of law or authority . "\l/her,e an appellant fails to assert his 
assignments of err )r with particularity and to support his positi n with sufficient authority, those 
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court." Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 
790,229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). It follows that a party waives an issue cited on appeal "if either 
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking. " Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 
857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012) (citation omitted). 
Bergeman s opening brief is a general attack on the district court's findings and 
conclusions and nothing more. See AOB at 16-20. In dismissing the second amended complaint, 
the district court analyzed each cause of action pled, and their clements, against the factual 
allegations of the complaint, and found the allegations did not support claims on which relief 
could be granted. R. 105-111. On appeal, Bergeman does not explain how the district court erred 
in applying the standard for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See AOB at 11-12, 16-20. He does 
not even cite the elements of misrepresentation, negligent supervision, trespass, or intentional or 
negligent infliction of emotional di stress or attempt to analyze how each claim's elements relate 
to his factual allegations. See AOB at 16-20. His opening brief does not mention the trespass or 
emotional distress claims at all. See AOB l-21. 
Bergeman's contention that the district court erred in denying his motion to consolidate 
suffers from the same lack of argument and particularity. J.R.C.P. 42 a)(2) states that the trial 
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court "may ... consolidate the actions" if the actions "invol e a common question of lm: or 
fact." The district court considered whether this action and Elabed' s eviction action shared 
common questions. of law and fact and decided they did not. R. 98-100. While recog lizing that 
standard in bis opening btief se OB 12-16, B rg inan doe not apply it and does not present 
any analysis of the standard or how it relate to the facts fthis ca e, see AOB 20. 
Because Bergeman fails to support his assignments of error with argument or authority, 
those claims of error are too indefinite to address. As such, he has waived the issues raised on 
appeal. See Bach, 148 Idaho at 790,229 P.3d at 1152 (refusing to consider bulk of Bach's claims 
on appeal because he failed to support them with relevant argument and authority). The Court 
should affirm the di strict court for this reason alone. 
B. Bergeman has not shown the trial court erred in dismissing his second amended 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
1. Bergeman aJleged no facts that the foreclosure of the property was wrongful 
and no cause of action that would set aside the foreclosure sale. 
Even if Bergeman has not waived his assignments of error, he still has not demonstrated 
any error by the district court. In his second amended complaint, Bergeman sought monetary 
damages, to set .aside the foreclosure sale, and to stop Elabed's attempted eviction action-all 
based on common law claims of misrepresentation, negligent supervision, trespass, and 
emotional distress. R. 40-45 . Each cause of action was premised on the underlying assumption 
that the foreclosure sale was "wrongful." See generally id. Bergeman, however, did not plead 
facts lo support a wrongful foreclosure. 
-11-
Under Idaho la" run action for vvrongful forecJosurc is et1uated with a cause of action for 
com'ersion. Se Houptv. Well Fa1·g0 Bank, Nat'! A s'n, 160 Idaho 181 , 189-90, 370 P.3d 384, 
392-93 (2016) (citations omitted). lender cannot foreclose a mortgaged property except as 
provided by statute, and the ailure to comply with the statutory procedures gives rise to a 
conversion action. Peterson v. Hailey Nat. Bank, 51 ldaho 427, 43 I-32, 6 P.2d 145, 147 (1931). 
In that situation, the lender becomes liable to th bonower just as anyon else who convert 
propc-rty. /d. Thus, the remedy is not the return of the property but damages measured by the 
value of the property at the time and place of sale. See id. at 43 3, 6 P .2d at 14 7. 
It necessarily follows that Bergeman cannot set aside the foreclosure sale, or halt 
Elabed's eviction action, even if the sale was wrongful. But even more problematic for 
Bergeman is that he plcd no facts to support a claim of wrongful foreclosure. Other than making 
conclusory allegations that the foreclosure sale was "wrongful," "bogus," and "invalid," 
Bergeman did not allege any facts to show that any defendant failed to comply with the 
recording, notice, or sale requirements of Idaho Code§§ 45-1505 and 45-1506. See R. 39-44 (11 
11-21). At most, he alleged that the defendants would not answer telephone calls or allow him to 
cure the default of a mortgage loan he was not party to. Id. 
To be sure, based on ihe second amended complaint, Bergeman had no rights under the 
deed ohrust or the mortgage loan. He admitted that his mother granted WMC Mortgage a dee,d 
of trust to secure the loan, R. 36-37 c,12), 53, 55; that following her death he never assumed the 
loan, R. 39 (if 13); that the loan remained in the name of the l•statc of Karen Hansen, id.; that he 
was not the executor of the estate, see R. 36 (if 1), 48-49; that the loan was in default at the time 
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of the foreclo ure sale, AOB 9, 16-17, 18, 19; and that the property was sold to Ela bed at the 
foreclosure sale R. 37-3 8 ( 6). Following the forecl sure sale, any rights the estat (or 
Bergeman) had in the property were extinguished. See Idaho Code § 45- 1508 ("A sale made by a 
trustee under this act shall foreclose and terminate all interest in the property covered by the trust 
deed of all persons to whom notice is given under section 45- 1506 Idaho Cod .... "). 
In sum, Bergeman did not allege facts to show the property was wrnngfoll taken from 
his possession. See Houpt, 160 Idaho at 190, 370 P.3d at 393 (stating con ersi 1n r quires distinct 
act of wrongfully asserted dominion o .er another's prop rty). Having admitted that he did not 
assume the mortgage loan and that the loan was in default, B rgeman did not state a claim for 
wrongful foreclosure, and he cannot set aside the foreclosure sale or stop Elabed's attempted 
eviction through this action. Bergeman's failure to allege a wrongful foreclosure also undermines 
his remaining claims seeking money damages. 
2. The misrepresentation claim fails because Bergeman did not pJead the 
factual circumstances constituting each element of fraud with particularity. 
SPS now turns to Bergeman's common law claims and request for damages. In the second 
amended complaint, Bergeman asserted a cause of action for misrepresentation based on 
allegations that "the defendaJilts" refused to discuss the foreclosure with him or his father, 
indicated they would accept "a certain payment" but then refused, stated in mortgage statements 
that the foreclosu11e sale would be vacated if he "made a mortgage payment," and misled Elabed 
into believing the foreclosure sale was valid. R. 40-42 ( 16). The district court dismissed the 
claim because Bergeman failed to plead whh particularity facts showing the defendants' 
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knowledge that the a1leged statements were- false their intent that he rely on the stalements, his 
right to rely on the statements, or how he was injured. R. I 05-107. 
The district court did not en. Accepting Bergeman's allegations as true, he did not state a 
cause of action for misrepresentation. The claim has nine elements: ( 1) a statement of fact, (2) its 
falsity) (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker' s knowledge of its fal ity, (5) the speaker's intent that 
there b reliance, (6) the hearer' s ignorance of the falsity of the statement, (7) reliance by the 
hearer, (8) the hearer's right to rely on the statement (i.e.,justifiable reHance), and (9) resultant 
injury. Jenkins v. Raise Cascade C01p., ]41 Idaho 233,239, 108 P.3d 380,386 (2005). The 
abs nee of just on element precludes recovery. Id. Further, Bergeman must support the 
existence of ach element '"by pleading with particularity the factual circumstances constituting 
fraud." ' See id. (citation omitted); see also I.R.C.P. 9(b). 
The failure to plead each element with specificity is grounds for dismissal. See Jenkins, 
141 Idaho at 239-40, 108 P.3d at 386-87. Jenkins illustrates this point. In that case, Jenkins 
asserted a claim of fraud related to the tennination of his employment. Id. at 237, 108 P.3d at 
384. The district court dismissed the claim because Jenkins failed to plead the fraud elements 
with specificity, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 239-40, 108 P.3d at 386-87. Both 
Jenkins 's original and amended complaints only generally alleged that the defendant was 
involved in several false accusations and statements. Id. In particular, there were no facts alleged 
that showed Jenkin's reliance on any representations made to him; in fact he admitted that he 
knew many of the statements made were false and did nothing about it Id. at 240, 108 P.3d at 
387. 
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Bergeman,s second amended compJaint also failed t specify what factual circum tances 
con titute fraud. His a1legations that the defendants failed to discus the status of the foreclosure 
sale is not actionable because it involves no statement at all. See R. 41 ( 16( a), (b) ). His 
allegation that the defendants indicated they would ace pt "a certain payment" does not specify 
which defendant made the statement, when the statement was made, how much should be paid, 
that the defendant knew the statement was false , that the defendant intended for him to rely on it, 
or that he did right rely on it. See R. 41 Ci1 t 6( c ), ( d)). His allegation that the defendants stated the 
foreclosure sale would be vacated if he "made a mortgage payment' also does not specify v ho 
the speaker was, that the defendant knowingly made a false statement or intended that he rely on 
the statement, or that he could rely on it. See R. 41 (116( e ), (f)). 
That Bergeman did not adequately plead the elements of fraud is perhaps best shown by 
his failure to allege with particularity his right to rely on any of the statements purportedly made 
by the defendants. lt is essential that the hearer' s reliance on the representation be justified. 
Stewart Title of Idaho, Inc. v. Nampa Land Title Co., 110 Idaho 330,332, 715 P.2d 1000, 1002 
(1986). Bergeman' s complaint showed that his reliance was not justified. [n pmiicular, he 
acknowledged that he did not assume the mortgage loan and was not the executor of his mother' s 
estate, and that the loan was in default. See R. 39 (113). To be sure, the complaint showed that 
the Estate of Karen Hansen was the borrower on the loan, that the estate was 745 days delinquent 
on the loan, that a total of 17,932.87 was due, and that the borrower " must pay this amount to 
bring your loan cuITent." R. 39 ( 13) , 53-63 . nder those allegations, Bergeman had no reason 
to believe the alleged statements that he could cure the default of the mortgage loan. 
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FinaUy, Bergcman's claim that the defendants committed fraud by misleading Elabed 
also fails. See R. 42 ,r 16 , g)- i)). Idaho does not recognize third party fraud in circumstances 
such as these. See Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 463 ~ 468~ 797 P.2d 863, 
868 (1990). Tn Beco Con, 'ltuclion~ the alleged misrepres ntation \Vas not directed to the plaintiff. 
Id, s a result, the Comi found the plaintiff failed to establish that it was expect d to Iely on the 
statement elem nt 5), that it was ignorant of the statement's falsity (element 6), that it relied on 
the statement (element 7), or that it had a ri ght to rely on the statement (element 8). ld. The same 
is t1ue here. Since Bergeman was not the hearer, he has not alleged facts to support a claim of 
misrepresentation based on statements the defendants made to Elabed. 
In sum, the Court hould affirm the district court' s dismissal of Bergeman's cause of 
action for misrepresentation. Because he fai led to plead the factual circumstances constituting 
each element with particularity, he did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
3. The negligent supervision claim fails because Bergeman did not allege facts 
to show that SPS owed a duty to protect him from an employ,ee's dangerous 
propensities. 
The district court also correctly dismissed Bergeman' s cause of action for negligent 
supervision. A negligent supervision claim i.s based on the supervisor 's negligence in failing to 
exercise due care to protect third parties from the foreseeable tortious acts of an employee. 
Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80, 86, l4 P.3d 1074, 1080 (Ct. App. 2000). To 
establish the claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant owed a legal duty to conform to a 
standard of conduct, a breach of that duty, a causal connection between the allegedly negligent 
c-0nduct and the plaintiff's injury, and damages. Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Servs., Inc., 123 
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Idaho 937, 945, 854 P.2d 280,288 (Ct. App. 1993). "Th duty requires the supervisor who 
knows of the supervisee's dang rous propensities to control the supervis e so he will not injure 
third perso 1s." Id. at 946, 854 P.2d at 289. 
According to the district court, Bergeman failed to allege that SPS or Elabed owed him 
any duty or that the. t 1tious acts of an employee were foreseeable. R. 106-107. The court also 
recognized that Bergeman did not assume the mortgage loan. R. l 07. All that is true. The 
complaint provided no factual allegations whatsoever to support the negligent supervision claim. 
See R. 36~46. In fact, the words "n gligent supervision" r words to that effect- w re only 
used in the heading of Count One. R. 40. Nowhere in the second amended complaint did 
Bergeman allege that SPS ( or any other defendant) supervised an employee, knew or should 
have known of an employee's dangerous propensities to har n third parties, owed a duty to 
protect him from an employee's dangerous propensities, or failed to exercise due care to protect 
him from an employee's dangerous propensities, causing him injury. See R. 36-42. 
In light of those failures, in his opening brief, Bergeman suggests, without citing any 
authority, that the district court improperly focused on the relationship between SPS and Elabed, 
rather than the relationship between SPS and its employees. AOB 17, 18. The district court' s 
order shows otherwise. See R. 106 (recognizing that negligent supervision claim is not based on 
vicarious liability). Bergeman also states that the court ignored "dear statements" made in the 
complaint "with respect to the managers and employees of SPS." AOB 9-10. But, again, the 
complaint contained no such statements and made no mention of any duty SPS owed to 
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superv1s its employees. Gi en Bcrgeman's failure to state a cause of action for negligent 
supervision, the Court must affirm the district court' s dismissal of the claim. 
4. The trespass claim fails because Bergeman did not allege facts to support 
wrongful foreclosure or eviction or that Ela bed was SPS's agent. 
Bergeman' s opening brief makes no mention of his trespass claim at all, and as such, he 
has waived any argument that the district com1's dismissa1 of the claim was in error. See supra, 
p. 10. But even if the Court considers the cf aim, the district court did not err. Trespass requires a 
showing that one wrongfully entered the premises and a causal connection between the 
defendant's alleged wrongful conduct and the plaintiffs injury, Mueller v. Hill, 158 Idaho 208, 
212-13, 345 P.3d 998, 1002-03 (2015); Nelson v. Holdaway Land & Cattle Co., 107 Idaho 550, 
552, 691 P.2d 796, 798 (Ct. App. 1984). "Trespass is a tort against possession committed when 
one, without permission, interferes with another's exclusive right to possession of the property." 
Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Tr. v. Nw. Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho 539, 
549, 916 P.2d 1264, 1274 (1996). 
Without specifying which defendant, Bergeman alleged that "these defendants appointed 
their agents, Silver Creek [sic] Realty and Mohamed Elabed to enter on the premises and to 
attempt to wrongfully evict the plaintiff and his current tenant thereon." R.. 43 ( 19). He also 
alleged that ~ labed entered the property and '"made rmmewus threats that he would take 
possession of the personal property of the plaintiff herein and begin various bui lding projects on 
the property as a result of the issuance of a bogus trustee's deed." R. 44 ( 21 ). The district court 
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found that the facts aUeged failed to shmv Bergeman possessed or had Jegal title t th · p1 p rty 
at the time of he alleged trespass or that he suffered any injury to the property. R. l 08. 
The district court was correct Silv rcreek Realty and Elabed we1'e statutorily entitled to 
possess the prnpe1ty after purchasing it at the forecJosure sale. See ]daho ode§§ 45-]508, 45-
1506(10)-(11 ). Because Bergeman failed to pres nt facts that support a wrongful foreclosure or 
eviction, Silvercreek Realty and Elabed did not wrongfully enter the property, and there can be 
no trespass. He also failed to allege any damage to the property, only the threat of damag . See 
R. 44 c,r 21). 
Lastly, the trespass claim against SPS cannot stand because it was based on the 
conclusory allegation that Silvercreek Realty and Elabed were SPS's agents when they entered 
the property. R. 38 (i[ 8), 43-44 (,r,r 19, 21). Bergeman did not support his claim of agency with 
any factual allegations.2 See id. There are three types of agencies: express authority, implied 
authority, and apparent authority. Shatto v. Syringa Surgical Ctr., LLC, 161 Idaho 127, 131, 384 
P.3d 374, 378 (2016). Bergeman did not allege facts to support the actual authori ty necessary for 
Silvercreek Realty or Elabed to act on behalf ofSPS through express or implied authority. See id. 
( explaining that express and implied authority are forms of actual authority). Nor did he allege 
any facts to support a reasonable beliefthat they acted on SPS 's behalf via apparent authority. 
2 The district court did not address Bergeman's conclusory allegations of agency, but the 
Court can. See Kuhn v. Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 248, 245 P.3d 992, 
1000 (2010) (stating that where lower comi's order is con-ect, but based on erroneous theory, 
order will be affirmed on correct theory) . 
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Se id. at ! .. 3 , 384 P .3d a 80 (explaining that npparent authority requires conduct by principal 
that would lead person to reasonably believe that another person acts on principa1' s behalf) . 
In sum, Bergeman's conclusory allegations of trespass and agency wer insumcient to 
show that SPS was directly liable for trespass or vicariously liable for SB ercre k Realty ' s or 
Elabed 's acts. See Owsley, 141 Idaho at 136, 106 P .3d at 462. The Court should affinn the 
district court's d ismissa] of the trespass claim. 
5. The infliction of emotional distress claims fail because Bergeman did not 
allege extreme or outrageous conduct (as to intentional infliction) or physical 
manifestation of emotional injury (as to negligent infliction). 
Like his trespass claim, Bergeman does not address the dismissal of his intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims in his opening brief: See AOB 1-21. Thus he has 
waived any claim of error in the dismissal of those claims. See supra, p. 10. Even so, the di trict 
court did not err in di smissing the claims. In his second amended complaint, Bergeman's only 
allegation of emotional distress was this: as a result of defendants' "intentional or negligent 
effort to take" his property and Elabed's eviction action, he "has suffered extreme emotional 
distress and continues to suffer the effect of this stress resulting in further emotional trauma and 
grief over the possible loss" of his property. R. 44 c, 21 ). 
The district court correctly found that those allegations do not state a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distvess. R. l 09-1 lO. The claim requives a plaintiff to show: (]) the 
defendanfs conduct was intentional or veckless. (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, (3) 
there was a causal connection between the condu.ct and the emotional distress, and (4) the 
emotional distress was seve~c. Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 
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P.3d 733, 740 2003). "By requiring b th condu 't of an 'outrageous ' nature and ' evere' 
emotional distress this rule affords com1s a menns of limiting fictitious claims. ' Hatfieldv. Max 
Rouse & Sons Nw .• 100 Idaho 840, 849 606 P.2d 944, 953 (1980), overruled on other grounds 
by Brtrwn v. Fritz, 108 ldaho .> 7, 359- 0, 699 P.2d 137 1, 1373- 74 (1985). 
Bergeman's allegations of improper foreclosme and attempted eviction do not constitute 
extreme or outrageous behavior. As discussed (at pp. 11 ~13), the second amended complaint 
does not support his claim that foreclosure and the attempted eviction were wrongfuL And even 
if the allegations were true, Bergeman did not allege that SPS was reckless, extreme, or 
outrageous in commencing foreclosure proceedings based on its rights under the mortgage loan. 
Idaho courts require "very extreme conduct" before awarding damages for the claim. 
Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 180, 75 P.3d at 741. Bergeman must have alleged conduct that rises to 
the level of"'atrocious"' or "'beyond all possible bounds of decency."' Id. (citation omitted). 
Whether such conduct is "so extreme and outrageous as to pennit recovery is a matter oflaw." 
Nation v. State, Dep 't of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 192, 158 P.3d 953,968 (2007). 
Examples of extreme and outrageous conduct supporting a claim for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress include an insurer's unfair dealings with a grieving widower, Walston v. 
Monumental Life Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 211, 2 19-20, 923 P.2d 456, 464-65 (1996); real estate 
developers swindling a family out of their "li fe long dream," Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 
774, 890 P.2d 714, 725 (1995); prolonged physical, mental, and sexual abuse, Curtis v. Firth, 
123 Idaho 598, 605-06, 850 P.2d 749, 756-57 (1993); or recklessly shooting and killing a donkey 
that was a pet and a pack animal, Gill v. Brown, 107 Idaho !137, 1138-39, 695 P.2d 1276, ]277-
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78 (Ct. App. ]985 . See also Hatfield, 100 Idaho at 850, 606 P.2d at 954 (citing case examples of 
''very extreme conduct~,). 
In contrast, in Edmondson, an employer's conduct surrounding the rightful termination of 
an employee did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct~ despite understanding 
the termination would cause the employee emotional distress. See 139 Idaho at 180, 75 P.3d at 
741; see also Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 149 Idaho 437, 446-47, 235 P.3d 387, 396-
97 (2010) ("Merely exercising a legal right does not satisfy the outrageousness element of an 
emotional-distress claim."). As alleged, SPS's actions fall within the circumstances of 
Edmondson, not those of Walston, Spence, or Curtis. Indeed, Bergeman admitted he did not 
assume the mortgage loan and that the loan was in default. R. 39 (if 13); AOB 9, 16-17, 18, 19. 
SPS did no more than insist on its rights in a permissible way. 
As for Bergeman's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the claim requires 
a showing of: (1) a legally recognized duty, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) a causal connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the breach, and (4) actual loss or damage. Frogley v. 
Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 155 Idaho 558,569,314 P.3d 613, 624 (2013). It also requires 
some physical manifestation of the plaintiffs emotional injury. Id. (stating requirement of 
physical injury is designed to provide degree of genuineness that claims of mental harm are not 
imagined). The district court dismissed the claim because Bergeman failed to allege the 
manifestation of a physical injury or a recognized legal duty on the part of SPS. R. 110-11 1. 
The district court was correct. Bergeman made no .allegation of having suffered any 
physic.al manifestation as a result of his alleged emoti.onal distress. R. 44 (12L) Rather he made 
-22-
the conclusory allegation that he "'suffered extreme ernotiona1 distress and continues to suffer the 
effect of this st.rre s 1·esulting in further emotional trauma and griet~~, Id. He also did not aJlege 
any legal duty that was breached by the foreclosure. See R. 36-46. SPS had no duty to refrain 
from foreclosing on prop 11 that s cured a mortgage loan in defau lt. Even assuming Bergeman 
was a borrower under the loan and SPS was a lender, the relationship in a borrower-lender 
situation is no more than one of debtor-cTeditor. See Idaho First Nat 'l Bank v. Bliss Valley 
Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,277,824 P.2d 841 , 852 (1991). But again, Bergeman admitted he did 
not assume the mortgage loan after his mother's death and that the loan was in default. 
[n sum, Bergeman failed to allege and cannot allege facts that would entitle him to relief 
for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Court must affirm the dismissal 
of these claims. 
C. Bergeman has not shown the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to consolidate this action with Elabed's eviction action because h.e does not 
address the abuse of discretion standard. 
If the district court correctly dismissed Bergeman' s amended complaint, there is no need 
to address his claim that the court ened in refusing to con olidate this action with Elabed's 
separate action to evict the tenant from the property. Even so, Bergeman has shown no error in 
the district court•s decision. His Bergeman' s burden to demonstrate that the district court abused 
its discretion. See Wechsler, 162 Idaho at 908,407 P.3d at 222. To show the district court abused 
its discretion, he argues, only, tbat " [i]t is not hard to conclude that the district court was more 
focused on the headache presented to it by virtue of the fi ling of the complaint (and amended 
complaints in District Court." AOB 20. Bergeman':s argument fai ]s because he does not address 
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the three-part abuse of discretion standard. See Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847,853,380 
P.3d 168, 174 (2016) (when party fails to address factors, such a "conclusory argument is fatally 
deficient" to the party's case). 
In addition, he does not demonstrate that the district court violated any paii of the 
standard. The district court satisfied the first part of the test, noting that it "may" consolidate 
under Rule 42(a). R. 99. It satisfied the second part of the test by properly considering whether 
the two actions involved common questions oflaw or fact. R. 99-100. The third prong of the test 
is also satisfied, because the district court's decision to deny consolidation was reasonable. In 
particular, it recognized that the law governing Bergeman's common law claims in this action is 
far different than the statutes governing tenancy and eviction proceedings. Id. 
Having failed to address or apply the abuse of discretion standard, Bergeman has shown 
no error in the district court's decision to deny his motion to consolidate. See Cummings, 160 
Idaho at 853,380 P.3d at 174 (affirming decision to grant motion for I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief); 
Wechsler, 162 Idaho at 909-10, 407 P.3d at 223-24 (affirming decision to grant motion to 
compel). As such, the Court must affirm that decision. 
D. Bergeman is not entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal because he cites no 
legal authority for such awards. 
In his opening brief, Bergeman seeks attorney fees on appeal based on the district court's 
"gross misapplication of the facts and the law" and SPS and Elabed's "efforts to mislead" the 
district court. AOB 10. A party is entitled to attorney fees on appeal only if a statute, contract, or 
court rule authorizes fees. Armandv. Opportunity Mgmt. Co., 155 Idaho 592,602, 315 P.3d 245, 
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255 (2013). ike the rest oJhis arguments on appeal, B rgeman cites no authority for his request; 
and faiUng to do so, he makes no attempts lo apply it. See AOB lO. Those failures preclude an 
award of attorney fees or costs on appeal. Se• late v. Zichko~ I 29 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 
970 (1996) ("When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions oflaw, authority, or 
argument th ,vill not be c.onsidered. '); Banner Life ins. Co. v. Mark Walla e Dixson 
Irrevocable Tr., 147 Idaho 11 7, 132-33 , 206 P.3d 481 , 496-97 (2009) (denying award of attorney 
fees on app al where party " failed to support her request with both argument and authority."). 
E. If SPS prevails, it is entitled to its attorney fees and costs on appeal under Idaho 
Code§ 12-121 and the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
SPS seeks its costs on appeal under I.A R. 40. SPS also seeks its attorney fees on appeal 
under Idaho Code§ 12-12 1, which permits the Court to award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party. Under the statute, an award of attorney fees on appeal is appropriate if the Court 
"determines that the action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation. " Turner v. Turner, 155 Idaho 819, 827, 317 P.3d 716, 724 (2013). "An appeal may 
be deemed frivolous, and attorney fees awarded, for failure to properly comply with I.A.R. 
35(a)(6)." Woods, 150 Idaho at 61,244 P.3d at 205 (awarding at1orney fees against party who 
failed to support arguments and allegations with citations to specific relevant legal authority) . 
In Turner and Woods, 1he Court awarded attorney fees to the respondent when the 
appellant failed to develop an argument as to the issues on appeal and failed to present little by 
way of citation to authority. Turner, 155 Idaho at 827, 317 P.3d at 724; Woods, 150 Idaho at 61 , 
244 P.3d at 205. Here Bergeman waived his assignments of error on appeal due to his failure to 
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provide argument and citation to authority as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(6). In short, Bergeman has 
failed to present a cogent argument as to why it should prevail on appeal. As a result, an award 
of SPS 's attorney fees is appropriate under to Idaho Code § 12-121 and I.A.R. 41. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
SPS respectfully requests the Court affirm the trial court's dismissal of Bergeman's 
amended complaint and denial of his motion to consolidate. Bergeman has waived each 
assignment of error by failing to cite either authority or argument in his opening brief. Even 
considering his assignments of en-or, Bergeman failed to allege facts that would support granting 
relief for wrongful foreclosure or on any of his common law claims. He also failed to show the 
district court violated any part of the abuse of discretion test in denying his motion to 
consolidate. 
DATED: May 21, 2018. 
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